Page:Aviation Accident Report, United Air Lines Flight 4.pdf/15

- 14- It is, of course, also possible that Captain Brown was confused by some other lights or objects which caused him to set a course too far to the east.

The time element was shortened by stiff northerly winds which were reported at 20 m.p.h. at the airport and may have been much stronger at higher attitudes. The fact that Trip 17 averaged 180 m.p.h. ground speed in its approach from Ogden to the Salt Lake Station would indicate that this was the case. Such a wind would have reduced the time in which any mistake could be rectified. Whatever caused Captain Brown to assume a wrong heading after breaking out of the overcast, it is obvious that had he continued on the north leg of the radio range until he arrived at the range station, the accident could not have occurred.

In any event, it seems fairly clear that while the airplane was proceeding on the improper course, nevertheless the members of the crew believed that they were heading toward the field. There is hardly room for doubt that the course had already been altered when the trip contacted the tower at 10:57 and reported that it was approaching the range station.

In view of the fact the crash occurred shortly after the trip had received coded weather information from the control tower, it is quite probable that the first officer was in the act of decoding the message at the time. If this were the case, it would probably tend to reduce the possibility of discovery of an error in course since the act