Page:Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure Experience.djvu/62

64 that the clarified and pennanent Weltbegriff will declare, 'Everything is this.' And is not this precisely the philosophy, or, if you prefer, the lack of it, of the 'plain man'? He it is that does full justice to the empirical diversity of the world. Science seeks to remove diversity by reducing things to common denominators. Metaphysics has not, since Aristotle at least, shown and disposition to recognize diversity. Possibly one should make an exception of Leibniz, but speaking generally, metaphysics has usually sought to absorb the empirical world with all its diversity and uniqueness into some form of an existent One, and there is much to suggest that this. One is the mystic ONE of Neo-Platonism.

But the 'plain man' never pretends that one thing is like another except for practical purposes. For him the common feature throughout the world is the fact that everything in it is a 'this.' And if one must ask the question 'Was ist alles?' one can answer from the point of view of pure experience only 'Alles ist dies. ' The 'Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung' really undertakes to describe the form of the evolution which our experience of the world has undergone and is still undergoing,—a form which might go along with one content or another. We should keep in mind that Avenarius is dealing with fact or with what we accept as equivalent to fact. We have the kind of experience that is expressed in what, following Avenarius, I have called 'the natural view of the world.' We have also the idealistic theory of reality, and this claims to be a scientific theory, and one which is more scientifically complete than any other metaphysic. But it describes reality in a way that obliges the man who does the actual work of making us acquainted with the world to assume a somewhat apologetic attitude.

We have also the fact that the actual idealism of history is a result of the fortunes of the idea of the soul and the idea of God, both of which must be assumed to have had entirely natural origins. This is, of course, no refutation of idealism, but it strengthens the presumption that something is wrong somewhere about the premises of idealism. The difficulty of making out just where the error lies may well be due to the fact that we are all bred up in the point of view which leads so logically into idealism. Avenarius saw on all hands a discontent with idealism, and I think it is fairly evident that this discontent has increased since Avenarius wrote, and is increasing.