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 granting summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. See Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep’t, 709 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir.2013) (summary judgment); LaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir.2009) (judgment on the pleadings).

As a threshold matter, we consider whether the authors’ associations have standing to assert infringement claims on behalf of their members.

Three of these authors’ associations—Authors Guild, Inc., Australian Society of Authors Limited, and Writers’ Union of Canada—claim to have standing, solely as a matter of U.S. law, to seek an injunction for copyright infringement on their members’ behalf. But, as we have previously explained, § 501 of “the Copyright Act does not permit copyright holders to choose third parties to bring suits on their behalf.” ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir.1991); see also Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir.1998) (“United States law permits suit only by owners of ‘an exclusive right under a copyright’….” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 501(b))). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that these associations lack standing to bring suit on behalf of their members, and they were properly dismissed from the suit.

The remaining four authors’ associations—Union des Écrivaines et des Écrivains Québécois, Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society, Sveriges Författarförbund, and Norsk faglitteraerfaglitterær [sic] forfattero og oversetterforening—assert that foreign law confers upon them certain exclusive rights to enforce the copyrights of their foreign members (an assertion that the Libraries do not contest on this appeal). These four associations do have standing to bring suit on behalf of their members. See Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 93–94 (recognizing that an association authorized by foreign law to administer its foreign members’ copyrights has standing to seek injunctive relief on behalf of those members in U.S. court).

As the Supreme Court has explained, the overriding purpose of copyright is “ ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts….’ ” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994) (quoting U.S. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 95 S.Ct. 2040, 45 L.Ed.2d 84 (1975). This goal has animated copyright law in Anglo-American history, beginning with the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of 1709, which declared itself to be “[a]n Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors … during the Times therein mentioned.” Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Anne, ch. 19. In short, our law recognizes that copyright is “not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers on authors the absolute ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual