Page:At the Eleventh Hour by T. G. Masaryk (1916).pdf/9



This Memorandum was originally intended by its author for the use of his personal friends in this country. But in view of the weightiness of its arguments and the great reputation of its author, we felt very strongly that it ought to be more widely circulated. As there are obvious objections to publication, it was decided to issue it as a confidential memorandum, for distribution among a strictly limited number of persons.

Professor Masaryk ought to-day to need no introduction even to English readers. He is not merely one of the acknowledged leaders of the Bohemian national movement, but was also one of the most marked personalities in the Austrian Parliament before the war drove him into exile. He has been a life-long democrat and enemy of reaction and militarism: his memorable speech on the Agram Treason Trial, and his pitiless exposure of the forgeries of the Friedjung Trial in 1909, created a sensation throughout Europe. He is also one of the leading Slav thinkers of his time, and his book on “Russia and Europe” greatly increased an already great reputation. London University has honoured herself not less than him by appointing him Lecturer in Slav Literature and Sociology at the New School of Slavonic Studies.

Professor Masaryk’s knowledge of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, and the Balkans is profound, and his knowledge of France, Italy, and Britain far from negligible. He has been for years a member of the Austrian Parliament, and on several occasions of the Austrian Delegation (which, under the constitution of the Dual Monarchy, exercises joint control with the Hungarian Delegation over the three Joint Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance). He has even been a member of the special committee of that Delegation dealing with the Austro-Hungarian Army. He was thus obliged to follow attentively all military questions and to study the whole problem of military administration. He is thus obviously specially qualified to use the comparative method in dealing with the armies of the belligerent countries.

It only remains to be said that in circulating this Memorandum we do so from a general sense of its importance, without necessarily committing ourselves to agreement with it in every detail.

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