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 of course protecting herself at the same time. There can be no doubt that Germany in already controlling Luxemburg, eagerly looks to Antwerp and to the Channel coast, and at the same time looks with disfavour upon Denmark. But it is safe to assume that Germany’s pressure on the West will be all the stronger and keener, if she has a huge economic Hinterland easily accessible on her eastern frontier.

Hence to contend that by liberating Central Europe the Allies would cut off Germany from the East, and thus force her to press the harder against the West, is an argument much more apparent than real. On the contrary, Germany cut off from the East, and no longer having Austria-Hungary and the Balkans at her disposal would be forced to rely upon her own forces, and would cease to be a danger to the West. Germany would be forced to revert to the agricultural pursuits which she has abandoned; her surplus population would be forced to emigrate, as in the past. The Eastern nations, Poland, Russia, &c., are under no obligation to render it possible for the German butcher, grocer, or professor to rear the largest possible family for the “inferior” nations of Eastern Europe to supply with food.

Viewed from this standpoint, the Franco-Russian Alliance has a greater significance than the mere negative and anti-German rôle ascribed to it by German politicians and historians. That it is anti-German is natural enough; for French and Russian politicians perceived the real situation of Germany and the meaning of her Drang nach Osten, and combined a programme to protect and liberate the Slav nations of Central Europe.

Britain’s accession to the Franco-Russian alliance proves the very same political idea. The fact that the long antagonism of Britain and Russia was bridged over, is an even clearer proof that the political evolution of Central Europe has been forcing upon the two former rivals a perception of the identity of their national and political interests. As so often happens in politics, the first overture was made in a secondary and local field (Persia, etc.), but the march of events widened the plan and brought out its real underlying idea. An idea, at first abstract and unclear, has to be put into concrete forms and clearly worked out. But in this case events so precipitated themselves, and the war took Russia and England so completely by surprise, that there has been practically no time to think out a political programme.

The German politicians perceive the real inner meaning of the Anglo-Russian agreement. More than once during the war they remembered Bismarck’s attitude towards Russia. It is not difficult to detect in many utterances of prominent German publicists and politicians (among others of Hindenburg himself) a hidden appeal to Russia. Russia and Germany, even a victorious Germany and a defeated Russia, would by their mere union be able to partition Europe and Asia.

But the Russians know that they would be a mere tool of Pan-German aspirations; and both Russian and British statesmen will agree that the liberation of Poland and Bohemia and the organisation of a Greater Serbia suits not only British and French, but also Russian political plans every bit as well. Germany separated from Russia will be weakened.

Often an objection is made that the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary would strengthen Germany: questions are put as to what would become of the Germans in Austria, and what