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 Bulgaria’s decision after a long period of hesitation, and the hesitation of Greece—is it possible not to see into the situation?

The Allies were guilty of a great strategic fault in allowing themselves to be surprised by Germany’s march to aid her Turkish ally; they ought to have had such reserves of men as to render any surprise impossible. It is to be hoped they will not be surprised once more in Mesopotamia, Armenia and Egypt.

The war is a war of the Great Powers of Europe; the small States are neutral, and will join one side or the other, according to the situation on the battlefield.

Britain, France and Russia must be able to defeat Germany, Austria and Turkey—therefore Britain and Russia must raise the necessary armies, if France has already brought up her full quota of men.

The political plan of Germany must be counterbalanced by a political plan of the Allies But until now, the Allies had no such plan, each had a special plan of his own. France aims at the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. England defended her naval supremacy, and Russia was eager to incorporate East Galicia. That was the real plan. The liberation of Belgium and of the small nations is a very noble, and a very practical programme; but hitherto it has merely been proclaimed in the abstract. The policy of the Allies is not directed by that programme.

The Allies must meet the German plan of Central Europe controlled by Germany, by the plan of Central Europe freed from German control. In my lecture on the Small Nations I have attempted to show, that Central Europe contains a peculiar zone of smaller, unfree or half free nations, and that the political organisation of this zone is the real task of the present war.

The Germans have grasped the vital importance of this ethnographical zone of Central Europe: their plan of Central Europe controlled by Germany has been conceived from the German standpoint. The tactics may change according to the situation: divide et impera was the rule up to now; for some time past they have been trying to persuade the nations of Central Europe that Germany is their best friend, that the Germans aspire to the ruling control, not only in her own interest but also in the interests of these nations themselves.

At any rate it is obvious that the German plan of Central Europe is a far-reaching and grandiose plan; the Allies must have an equally far-reaching plan for the treatment of Central Europe. And the German plan is not only grandiose and far-reaching, but it is at the same time practical: the Allies must have an equally practical programme.

This plan of the Allies can only consist in an energetic endeavour to liberate the Non-German nations of Central Europe.

Central Europe comprises the East of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and the Eastern part of Russia (Poland). The restoration and liberation of Poland, of Bohemia comprising the Slovak country of North Hungary, and the organisation of Greater Serbia is the first and essential task of the Allies; all other questions will be solved easily if the Allies perform this task.