Page:At the Eleventh Hour by T. G. Masaryk (1916).pdf/26

 over the Russian main headquarters obviously should not have executed a strategical plan, the realisation of which depended upon the unity of the Allies, if this unity did not exist.

The universal demand for unity and co-operation is quite just, and, as we see, the military authorities concur with the civilian critics on that point. But if a common plan is demanded, one assumption is tacitly implied, namely, that those whose task it is to co-operate and to devise a plan shall be the right men for the task. Incapable men meeting together in committee will not thereby become capable and efficient. Capable men are wanted-whether in the Government, diplomacy, or the armies.

All such questions (for instance the question whether the Government is to be composed of many or a few members, &c.) are very important, but none the less matters of form. The war is an event so gigantic, that everywhere great men are longed for-men equal to the grandeur of the emergency. The war has made it manifest that, in all countries, many members of the Government, though possibly quite good in times of peace, are not in any way equal to so tremendous an occasion.

The public, therefore, is not content with formal, and proceeds to material, criticism. “The diplomatists are to blame for our want of success.” “There have been too many diplomatists and strategists.” “The military authorities refuse to carry out what the civil authorities propose and demand.” These and kindred objections can be read now every day.

My own experience with Austrian diplomacy makes me prone to join the chorus of those who criticise diplomatists; but it is not they only who have been to blame. I do not defend them, because I know quite well what some diplomatists of the Allies have done in the various countries; many people know it and point their fingers at several personages. Possibly some of them could defend themselves by arguing that their Government very often did not listen to their reports; but in any case it is the various Governments and Foreign Offices which are responsible for their diplomacy.

I would insert here a word on the military attachés. All the Governments have had their military attachés in Berlin for years past. What were these gentlemen doing in Berlin? What did they see and hear there and at the many manœuvres? But I will be just—the German attachés were no better! They did not see that Russia was more prepared than was expected: they did not see that Austria was much less prepared than she herself pretended: they did not see the excellent ’75mm. guns of the French.

After the war objections of this kind may serve for reconstructing the whole administrative machinery of the State; but the results of the war depend on our preparation to-day, and therefore these preparations must be scrutinised more closely than ever before, with a view to strengthening the efficiency of the armies and of the Governments. The Governments and the Army Commanders are responsible for the failures; a third factor, and in war-time a very momentous one, even in constitutional States, are the dynasties.

In these reflections only a brief mention has been made of the British Navy; but there are also the French, Italian, and Russian Navies. The four Navies combined could have done a good deal of work if there had been a comprehensive strategic plan.

Perhaps the time for the Navies will come, when Belgium, the Baltic provinces, Austria (Triest,. Pola) and Turkey will be pressed and occupied by the victorious armies of the Allies.

On the whole the decision will be brought about on land.