Page:At the Eleventh Hour by T. G. Masaryk (1916).pdf/21

 imagination in anticipating and foreshadowing the different possibilities. At the same time people are fantastic, constructing rather wild pictures of the nearest future, pictures which are of course merely the fond offspring of their own wishes.

My explanation of the fact is this: The English feel great security on their island; for generations they have felt the satisfaction of being the rulers of the greatest Empire in the world, and they learn from history that they repulsed the attack of Napoleon. It is from this cause that the British have been relatively slow to realise the peculiar importance of the war for their own country. Lulled in security, they still do not realise sufficiently the danger of the near future. The belief in the British Navy and in the protection afforded by the insular position of the country prevents people from seeing the consequences of a German victory. Germany organising Central Europe and utilising it according to the Pangerman programme, would attack England in Asia and Africa. Germany would be richer and would therefore be able to build a great Navy. By and by the insular position of England would become full of danger and isolation. Germany would control Asia and Africa by land, not only from Trieste, &c.

And there is another feature of England in connection with that feeling of security. England is rich, richer than Germany; the Englishman is accustomed to have his bread and butter, his comforts: a great portion of the nation live even in luxury—the hungry German (even if satiated, the German is in fear of starvation) is always on the qui vive, he is more versatile, more imaginative and effective. Again I must lay stress upon the difference between temporary hunger and degrading starvation.

“Business as usual” is a two-edged motto—a watchword and a boast. The English admit quite frankly that they were not prepared for the war, but in doing so they are usually thinking only of military preparation whereas this unpreparedness is of a wider range and significance. Indeed it will, I believe, be admitted that, so far, Britain has had to pay the premium of apprenticeship. Other nations, especially the Russians (but the Germans also), have also had to learn from experience in this war; but the English have to learn more and they must become quicker in putting the teachings of the war into practice.

Let me give some concrete instances of this striking deficiency. Take first the battle of Ctesiphon.

As soon as it became manifest that the Germans were approaching Constantinople, it was of vital interest for England to counterbalance the German victory in the Balkans by the possession of Baghdad, the more so as the Germans have been proclaiming for years and years that Constantinople will bring them to Baghdad. But what happened in Mesopotamia? After the first advance towards Baghdad the British troops had to retire, for lack of water. Is it possible in those regions to advance without good supplies of water for men and animals? Was the nature of the territory not known to the British? Did they not learn from the Italians in Tripoli the need of providing water? What kind of intelligence service has the Army in Mesopotamia?

Next day the retirement of the British was explained by the fact that the Turks had much larger forces. But how could it happen that the British did not know at least the approximate strength of the enemy? There were also some rumours that the Arab tribes were treacherous; supposing that this were true, would that be an excuse? The British had been in Mesopotamia long enough for the staff to know the situation.