Page:At the Eleventh Hour by T. G. Masaryk (1916).pdf/15



At present the Allies have larger armies, and they even outnumber the Enemy at the front; but next spring the Enemy will be much stronger than he is now, as he is levying great forces. The Allies, of course are doing the same, and so it will depend not so much upon which side will have more men next Spring, as upon which will have the larger number of properly equipped soldiers.

At present the Allies outnumber the Enemy; they have more men, perhaps even more soldiers. Why, then, is the Enemy more victorious? Only one answer is possible. The Enemy uses his forces better and more effectively than the Allies.

(1) The Enemy was better prepared for the war. Indeed, it is not too much to say that only he was prepared. Even France, in spite of 1870–71, in spite of ideas of revenge, was not prepared. Russia may be said to have been better prepared than might have been expected, while Britain, with the exception of the Navy, was not prepared at all.

The Austrian Army was not well prepared, as was proved by the defeats which she suffered in the first phase of the war.

(2) The decisive result of being prepared was that Germany started with greater forces than the Allies, at least in the West. It was only in the course of the war that the Allies could equal, and later on outnumber, the Enemy.

(3) The Enemy, as his countries are in close neighbourhood, was able to centralise his forces. At the beginning of the war Austria proceeded more independently, but her failures induced her to accept the German leadership. At present Berlin is the head, the only deciding head, of the Enemy, while the Allies are divided into four headquarters. In war a single narrow-minded leader is better than ten leaders of genius who are not united.

(4) This centralisation and unity is not only strategical; industry, commerce, and railways are centralised and unified as well, and therefore more effective.

(5) The Enemy from the beginning had a clearer political plan of what he wanted to achieve.

The Germans have a very large political literature, in which the Pangerman plan was discussed and, in the course of the discussion, clearly shaped. It is a mistake to believe that Pangermanism was, and is, merely Utopian. There was, and is, a Utopian element in it, but on the whole it very soon developed into a realistic doctrine, culminating in the plan of uniting all Germans in an economic organisation of the whole of Central Europe. (A more detailed exposition of Germany’s political plan in this war will be given later, § 24.)

Until now the Allies have had no such plan.

A political plan is essential for an army. In the German-Army there are thousands and thousands of officers of all ranks who prosecute the Pangerman idea, and not only officers, but hundreds and thousands of soldiers as well, have been educated in Pangerman ideas.

The leaders of an army must have a positive political plan, so as to know what territory to occupy, how to behave in the occupied territory, what to do there, and how to prepare for the future, &c.

(6) Public opinion, especially in Germany, is well led by the Universities and the whole machinery of schools journalism and literature. The Germans made a very effective use of 1em