Page:Arrington v. United Royalty Co.pdf/8

 the grantor, which is not altered by the stipulation that the grantee should not be a necessary party in the leasing of the land, or that it authorized the grantor to execute such leases. Cheatham v. Beck, 96 Ark. 230, 131 S. W. 699; Deming Investment Co. v. Bank of Judsonia, 170 Ark. 65, 278 S. W. 634; Hughes on Arkansas Mortgages, § 475; Dunlap v. Jackson, 92 Okla. 246, 219 Pac. 314.

It follows, under the authority of Dunn v. Smith, (Tex. Civ.) 23 S. W. 449; Bank of Mulberry v. Sprague, 185 Ark. 410, 47 S. W. (2d) 601; and Connerly v. Hoffman, 184 Ark. 497, 42 S. W. (2d) 985, that the appellee, not having been made a party to the foreclosure proceeding under which appellant claims, may invoke the statute of limitation, and, as it is conceded that as to third parties the debt was barred for failure to comply with the provisions of § 7382 of the Digest, the court correctly held that appellee's title was prior and paramount to that of the appellant, and its decree is therefore affirmed.