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Rh See id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 26–27). The text of the Constitution (which mentions Indians only in the contexts of commerce and apportionment) is completely silent on any such trust relationship. See Art. I, §§2, 8; Amdt. 14, §2. Further, the trust relationship does not have any historical basis. Its genesis is usually traced to this Court’s statement in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831), that the relation of the United States to Indians has “resembl[ed] that of a ward to his guardian,” id., at 17; see also F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law §2.02[2], p. 117 (2012) (Cohen). However, that statement was dicta, see Haaland, 599 U. S., at ___–___ (, dissenting) (slip op., at 25–27); and, in any event, the Indian Tribe in that case had a specific treaty calling for the Federal Government’s “protection,” Cherokee Nation, 5 Pet., at 17. Some treaties with tribes have contained similar provisions; others have not. Compare Treaty With the Wyandots, 7 Stat. 31, with Treaty With the Mohawks, 7 Stat. 61. And, of course, some tribes before and after the Founding engaged in warfare with the Federal Government. Cohen §1.03[2], at 36; id., §1.03[3], at 40. In short, the idea of a generic trust relationship with all tribes—to say nothing of legally enforceable fiduciary duties—seems to lack a historical or constitutional basis.

In future cases, we should clarify the exact status of this amorphous and seemingly ungrounded “trust relationship.” As a start, it would be helpful to acknowledge that many of this Court’s statements about the trust relationship were mere dicta. E.g., Seminole Nation, 316 U. S., at 293–294 (discrete trust); Mancari, 417 U. S., at 551–552 (equal protection challenge to Government hiring program); Seber, 318 U. S., at 707 (state taxes on Indian lands). In the meantime, however, the Court should take care to ensure that this confusion does not spill over into yet further areas of the law.