Page:Arizona v. Navajo Nation.pdf/17

Rh

, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion in full, but write separately to highlight an additional and troubling aspect of this suit. For decades, this Court has referred to “a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 225 (1983); see also Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296–297 (1942); Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op., at 12). Here, in allowing the Navajo Nation’s “breach of trust” claim to go forward, the Ninth Circuit appears to have understood that language as recognizing a generic legal duty of the Federal Government toward Indian tribes or, at least, as placing a thumb on the scale in favor of declaring that legal duties are owed to tribes. See 26 F. 4th 794, 813 (2022). As the Court explains, the Nation has pointed to no source of legally enforceable duties supporting its claim in this suit. But the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning reflects deeper problems with this Court’s frequent