Page:Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n.pdf/55

16 The majority draws attention to the minority report in Baldwin. Ante, at 29. Under the present circumstances, I take some comfort in the Court’s willingness to consider dissenting views. Still, the minority report does not diminish the force of Baldwin. The report cites a Michigan Supreme Court precedent that allegedly reached a contrary result, but that case turned entirely on state constitutional questions arising from a state election—not federal constitutional questions arising from a federal election. See ''People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett'', 13 Mich. 127 (1865). The majority also contends that Baldwin “appears in tension with” an earlier House Elections Committee precedent. Ante, at 29. By its own terms, however, that earlier precedent did not involve a conflict between a state legislative act and a state constitutional provision. See Shiel v. Thayer, 1 Bartlett Contested Election Cases, H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 57, 38th Cong., 2d Sess., 350 (1861) (“the two branches of the legislature differed upon the question … and so the bill never became a law”). In any event, to the degree that the two precedents are inconsistent, the later decision in Baldwin should govern.

The next relevant precedent is this Court’s decision in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1 (1892). That case involved a constitutional provision with considerable similarity to the Elections Clause, the Presidential Electors Clause of Article II: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors … .” §1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The question was whether the state legislature, as a body of representatives, could divide authority to appoint electors across each of the State’s congressional districts. The Court