Page:Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n.pdf/51

12 ” referred not just to “the two houses of the legislature” but to “the entire legislative power of the state … however exercised.” Brief for Petitioner, O. T. 1931, No. 617, p. 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court did not respond by holding, as the majority today suggests, that “ ‘the Legislature’ comprises the referendum and the Governor’s veto in the context of regulating congressional elections,” or that “ ‘the Legislature’ has a different identity” in the Elections Clause than it does in Article V. Ante, at 18–19. Instead, the Court in Smiley said this: "“Much that is urged in argument with regard to the meaning of the term ‘Legislature’ is beside the point. As this Court said in Hawke … the term was not one ‘of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Constitution. What it meant when adopted it still means for purposes of interpretation. A Legislature was then the representative body which made the laws of the people.’ ” 285 U. S., at 365 (quoting Hawke, 253 U. S., at 227)."

Remarkably, the majority refuses to even acknowledge the definition of “the Legislature” adopted in both Smiley and Hawke, and instead embraces the interpretation that this Court unanimously rejected more than 80 years ago.

The history of the Elections Clause further supports the conclusion that “the Legislature” is a representative body. The first known draft of the Clause to appear at the Constitutional Convention provided that “Each state shall prescribe the time and manner of holding elections.” 1