Page:Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n.pdf/39

Rh in Election Law Reform, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 997, 1006–1008 (2005) (describing cases in which “indirect pressure of the initiative process … was sufficient to spur [state] legislature[s] to action”). Turning the coin, the legislature’s responsiveness to the people its members represent is hardly heightened when the representative body can be confident that what it does will not be over­ turned or modified by the voters themselves.

Invoking the Elections Clause, the Arizona Legislature instituted this lawsuit to disempower the State’s voters from serving as the legislative power for redistricting purposes. But the Clause surely was not adopted to di­minish a State’s authority to determine its own lawmak­ing processes. Article I, §4, stems from a different view. Both parts of the Elections Clause are in line with the fundamental premise that all political power flows from the people. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404–405 (1819). So comprehended, the Clause doubly empow­ers the people. They may control the State’s lawmaking processes in the first instance, as Arizona voters have done, and they may seek Congress’ correction of regula­tions prescribed by state legislatures.

The people of Arizona turned to the initiative to curb the practice of gerrymandering and, thereby, to ensure that Members of Congress would have “an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.” The Federalist No. 57, at 350 (J. Madison). In so acting, Arizona voters sought to restore “the core principle of republican government,” namely, “that the voters should choose their representa­tives, not the other way around.” Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 Texas L. Rev. 781 (2005). The Elec­tions Clause does not hinder that endeavor.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona is Affirmed.