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Rh 1808. But “they have succeeded to a great degree [in limiting the conflict of interest implicit in legislative con­trol over redistricting].” Ibid. They thus impede legisla­tors from choosing their voters instead of facilitating the voters’ choice of their representatives.

Banning lawmaking by initiative to direct a State’s method of apportioning congressional districts would do more than stymie attempts to curb partisan gerrymander­ing, by which the majority in the legislature draws district lines to their party’s advantage. It would also cast doubt on numerous other election laws adopted by the initiative method of legislating.

The people, in several States, functioning as the law­making body for the purpose at hand, have used the initia­tive to install a host of regulations governing the “Times, Places and Manner” of holding federal elections. Art. I, §4. For example, the people of California provided for perma­nent voter registration, specifying that “no amendment by the Legislature shall provide for a general biennial or other periodic reregistration of voters.” Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §2123 (West 2003). The people of Ohio banned bal­lots providing for straight-ticket voting along party lines. Ohio Const., Art. V, §2a. The people of Oregon shortened the deadline for voter registration to 20 days prior to an election. Ore. Const., Art. II, §2. None of those measures permit the state legislatures to override the people’s pre­scriptions. The Arizona Legislature’s theory—that the lead role in regulating federal elections cannot be wrested from “the Legislature,” and vested in commissions initiated by the people—would endanger all of them.

The list of endangered state elections laws, were we to sustain the position of the Arizona Legislature, would not stop with popular initiatives. Almost all state constitu­tions were adopted by conventions and ratified by voters