Page:Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n.pdf/29

Rh As to the “power that makes laws” in Arizona, initia­tives adopted by the voters legislate for the State just as measures passed by the representative body do. See Ariz. Const., Art. IV, pt. 1, §1 (“The legislative authority of the state shall be vested in the legislature, consisting of a senate and a house of representatives, but the people reserve the power to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject such laws and amend­ments at the polls, independently of the legislature.”). See also Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U. S. 668, 672 (1976) (“In establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise be assigned to the legislature.”). As well in Arizona, the people may delegate their legislative authority over redistricting to an inde­pendent commission just as the representative body may choose to do. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15–16 (answering the Court’s question, may the Arizona Legislature itself estab­lish a commission to attend to redistricting, counsel for appellant responded yes, state legislatures may delegate their authority to a commission, subject to their preroga­tive to reclaim the authority for themselves).

The dominant purpose of the Elections Clause, the historical record bears out, was to empower Congress to override state election rules, not to restrict the way States enact legislation. As this Court explained in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U. S. 1 (2013), the Clause “was the Framers’ insurance against the possibility that a State would refuse to provide for the election of representatives to the Federal Congress.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (citing The Federalist No. 59, pp. 362–363 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)).