Page:Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n.pdf/21

Rh of the State for [that] purpose.” 253 U. S., at 230.

Smiley v. Holm raised the question whether legislation purporting to redistrict Minnesota for congressional elec­tions was subject to the Governor’s veto. The Minnesota Supreme Court had held that the Elections Clause placed redistricting authority exclusively in the hands of the State’s legislature, leaving no role for the Governor. We reversed that determination and held, for the purpose at hand, Minnesota’s legislative authority includes not just the two houses of the legislature; it includes, in addition, a make-or-break role for the Governor. In holding that the Governor’s veto counted, we distinguished instances in which the Constitution calls upon state legislatures to exercise a function other than lawmaking. State legisla­tures, we pointed out, performed an “electoral” function “in the choice of United States Senators under Article I, sec­tion 3, prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth Amend­ment,” a “ratifying” function for “proposed amendments to the Constitution under Article V,” as explained in Hawke v. Smith, and a “consenting” function “in relation to the acquisition of lands by the United States under Article I, section 8, paragraph 17.” 285 U. S., at 365–366.

In contrast to those other functions, we observed, redis­tricting “involves lawmaking in its essential features and most important aspect.” Id., at 366. Lawmaking, we further noted, ordinarily “must be in accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments.” Id., at 367. In Minnesota, the State’s Con­stitution had made the Governor “part of the legislative process.” Id., at 369. And the Elections Clause, we ex­plained, respected the State’s choice to include the Gover­nor in that process, although the Governor could play no part when the Constitution assigned to “the Legislature” a