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 he will be open in friendship and hatred, really straight-forward and deeply truthful, but reserved and ironical in manner to common people. He will live for his friend alone, will wonder at nothing, will bear no malice, will be no gossip, will not be anxious about trifles, will care more to possess that which is beautiful than that which is profitable. His movements are slow, his voice is deep, and his diction is stately.

The four last virtues in the table are qualities to adorn the external man in society, and as such seem more worthy of a place in Lord Chesterfield’s Letters than in a treatise of Moral Philosophy. To be mild without being spiritless; to be friendly without servility; to have a simple manner without either assumption or mock-humility; and to be witty without buffoonery,—these achievements constitute the minor excellences with which Aristotle concludes his list. He was proceeding to show that the law of the mean is exemplified in the instinctive feelings of modesty and virtuous indignation—when, through some unknown cause, his MS broke off (‘Eth.’ IV. ix. 8) in the middle of a sentence.

What should have followed here was, first, a dissertation on the nature of Justice; and, secondly, an account of the Intellectual excellences. And it was very important that this part of the work should be adequately executed. Under the head of Justice fell to be considered (‘Eth.’ IV. vii. 7) the relation of the individual to truth of word and deed. And an adequate account of Justice and of Wisdom might have redeemed Aristotle’s previous account of moral virtue from that superficial appearance which it must be said