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 —and how is it ascertained? Aristotle tells us that it is not merely the mid-point between two external quantities, but it is the mid-point relatively to the moral agent. What is too much for one man—say, of danger, expense, indulgence, or self-valuation—may be by no means too much for another man. The moral mean is thus a fluctuating quantity, dependent on considerations of the person and the moment. To hit upon it exactly requires a fine tact, for “virtue is more nice and delicate than the finest of the fine arts” (‘Eth.’ II. vi. 9). This tact, or sense of moral beauty, we have by nature (‘Politics,’ I. ii. 12); but it only exists in perfection, after cultivation by experience, in the mind of the wise man, and to him in all cases must be the ultimate appeal.

Objection has been raised in modem times to the theory of Aristotle, on the ground that it makes only a quantitative difference between virtue and vice. A little more or a little less does not seem to us to constitute the whole difference which subsists between “right” and “wrong.” But we must remember that the Greeks did not speak of actions as “right” or “wrong,” but as “beautiful” and “ugly.” From this point of view each action was looked upon as a work of art; and as in art and literature, so in morals, the great aim was to avoid the “too much” and the “too little,” and thus to attain perfection. This idea of beauty and grace in action pervaded the Hellenic life, and good taste seemed to stand in the place of conscience. To attain “the beautiful” is considered by Aristotle, if inferior to the joys of philosophy, still as a source of very high