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CH. III.] influences, and the latter, which is a result from reasoning, being true or false, is removed from the will; but imagination on the contrary, can be exercised how and when we please. It is difficult either to represent graphically the process here alluded to, or to determine the precise import of the text; and other versions seem to be equally indefinite. The Latin is, "licet namque, cum libet, fingere quicquid volumus, atque ante oculos ponere, perinde atque ii faciunt qui, in artificiosæ memoriæ comparatis atque dispositis locis, imaginis fingunt atque simulacra collocant," and the French, "et l'on peut s'en mettre l'objet devant les yeux, comme le pratiquent ceux qui traduisent les choses en signes mnémoniques, et inventent des symboles." Hence, an opinion, arrived at by a chain of reasoning drawn from particulars which we hold to be true, cannot but affect us differently from imaginings which are of our own coining, and which we know to be fictitious. A succeeding passage, which shews that imagination cannot be opinion, is to the same purport for, being derived from particulars, its issue is, so to say, independent of us; but imagination may be exercised upon any combinations which the will may choose to recall.

Note 4, p. 147. But the motion produced by the act, &c.] The wording, by the act, is but an indifferent representative of the original ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας, and yet its exact signification, or its relation to the ἐντελέχεια is by no means obvious; the phrase, besides, notwithstanding