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CH. I.] with which we are acquainted, no sense can be wanting; and Cuvier adopted a similar argument to prove that no animal, unknown to Zoology, remains to be discovered.

Note 2, p. 132. And this we are able to do, &c.] This passage is elliptical and obscure; but, as "the is too closely connected with the example something sweet to admit of being separated," it may imply that the sight may, by colour and refraction, determine the quality of a particular fluid. But, as no sense can judge, excepting indirectly, of compound qualities, the perception of such is accidental, a kind of guess, that is, just as it would be in the case of a fair individual, in the example of Cleon's son.

Note 3, p. 133. The senses, however, do perceive , &c.] This passage remains, according to its wording, unintelligible, notwithstanding the attention bestowed upon it by commentators, because of the difficulty of attaching any sense to the assumption, that the senses can become as one. The comment "si unum et idem uno et eodem tempore a diversis sensibus percipitur, ni sensus in unum coalescunt," assumes but does not shew that the senses can so coalesce, and then judge of impressions made upon them individually. And thus here again is required a central organ, the common origin of the perceptive power of the senses, to which all impressions are to be referred and by which they are to be compared; and such an organ is the brain. But still, from the moment that we judge of more