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14 before that which thinks. Now, the knowledge of any thing in itself seems to be useful towards a right conception of the causes of the accidents in substances; as, in mathematics, the knowledge of straight and curve, line and surface, is requisite for perceiving to how many right angles the angles of the triangle are equal. But the knowledge of the accidents contributes, largely, in its turn, towards knowing what the thing, essentially, is; for whenever we may be able, from the appearance of any substance, to recount the whole or the greater number of its accidents, we are then best prepared to say what its essence is. Thus, the essence is the proper beginning for every demonstration, so that all the definitions, which do not make known, or make it easy to conjecture what may be the accidents of any substance, are to be regarded as dialectic and unprofitable subtleties.

It is difficult to determine whether all the emotions of Vital Principle are common to it and its recipient, or whether some one emotion belongs to it exclusively; and this is a question, which, although not easily settled, it is necessary to entertain. There is scarcely one of the many emotions which are derived from the Vital Principle, (as anger, or courage, desire, or feeling,) in the manifestation of which the Vital Principle can be said to be affected, actively or passively, without the body; the faculty of thought seems to be the peculiar property of the Vital Principle