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CH. II.] signifies stupefaction of the faculties rather than what is here attributed to it. Thus, either Democritus must have misquoted, or the Iliad, since Aristotle's time, have suffered, as is commonly believed, more than one mutilation. The purport of the passage, however, is sufficiently obvious.

Note 5, p. 21. Thus Democritus does not employ the term mind, &c.] He made mind, that is, to be a sentient principle and identified with those filings and emotions, which Aristotle held, as has been shewn, to be but emanations from the corporeal organs and functions, to be manifestations, that is, of the temperament. An apology has been offered for this attribution of mind to all creatures, in that such a principle may seem to be represented by the consummate order which prevails in their constitution; and thus that Anaxagoras may have meant that, while it may be present, objectively, in all beings, it can be present, subjectively, (as mind, that is) only, in a few. Plato seems to imply something like this when adopting one essence or faculty which is eternal and unbegotten, and another which has no abiding and is perishable—the one capable, by intellect with cogitation, of comprehending unchangeable natures; and the latter capable, by opinion with sensual perceptions, of comprehending whatever is casual and ephemeral.

Note 6, p. 21. Have said that the Vital Principle comprises all first causes, &c] Aristotle observes that, as