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CH. X.] move. But when Vital Principle is divided into parts, and parts are distinguished by their faculties, very many are made apparent, as the nutritive, the sentient, the cogitative, the deliberative, and the appetitive, and these differ from one another more than do the desiring and the passionate.

The appetites admit of being opposed to one another, and this occurs when reason may be opposed to desire, but the opposition can be manifested only in beings with a sense of time; for the mind commands to resist on account of the future, while desire urges to immediate compliance, as that which is good appears, as the future is unseen, to be absolutely good and absolutely grateful. Thus, the appetitive faculty, in so far as appetitive, may, in a specific sense, be the motor, but it is the object desired by appetite which is the first to set in motion ; for without having been itself moved, it incites to move from having been thought upon or imagined; and there are several such motors. There are three terms here : the motor; then that by which it moves; and thirdly, that which is moved. But the motor is in the two-fold sense of unmoved, and both motor, and moved—the unmoved is the practical good ; the motor and moved is the appetitive stimulus or appetition (for that which is moved moves only in so far as it desires, and appetite is a motion or an act of some kind) ; and the moved is the animal. As the organism by which appetite