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and the two following chapters are upon the parts or powers rather, which give to animals locomotion; but, as the nervous even the muscular system had not then been made out, the text is encumbered, occasionally, as might be expected, with speculations which may now seem idle, and distinctions which are almost futile. Aristotle makes “animals to move and be moved for the sake of something, which is the limit of all their movements; and the moving powers of an animal are, perceptibly, he adds, thought and imagination, election, will and desire, which are all referrible to mind and appetite, εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν. Thus, as imagination and perception are alike able to direct an animal, they are in one and the same relation to the mind. The argument, in fact, dwells upon the motive as well as the object for progression, without a word concerning the agency by which it is to be effected, as if the muscular power of the body were unknown, or