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152 thinking upon it. It is very improbable, therefore, that the mind should have been commingled with the body; for were this the case, it would be a quality of some kind, as hot or cold, or it would have some kind of organ as there is for the sensibility, but no such organ is to be found. It is well said by some that Vital Principle is the place of forms, only this is to be understood of Vital Principle, not as a whole but as a cogitative faculty, and of forms, not in reality but, in potentiality.

It is manifest, from the nature of the sentient organs and sensation, that the quiescent state of the sentient is not the same as that of the cogitative part. For the sensibility is unable to distinguish impressions in excess, as a sound amid loud sounds, or a colour or odour among brilliant colours or pungent odours, but the mind, on the contrary, when thinking intensely upon any subject, can still think and with increased rather than diminished intensity upon the subordinate details; the sensibility, besides, cannot be without a body, but the mind is separable. When thus situated, the mind can become each of the subjects of thought, as an individual is said to be learned actually (and this may be said when he is able at will to employ his learning,) because he is at the same time equally learned in potentiality, although not as he was before he had learned or invented something; for when so learned he is able to reflect upon his learning.