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respect to the part of Vital Principle by which it both knows and reflects, whether that part be separate, or separate, not substantively but, in an abstract sense only, let us now consider in what it is distinguished from other parts, and how thinking is at any time exercised. If thinking be such as is feeling, then it may be some kind of impression by the subject of thought, or other analogous agency. But then that which thinks must be impassive, receptive of the form of objects, and, in potentiality, the same as the object, without actually being so. The mind, in fine, must be related to subjects of thought as the sensibility is to objects of perception. It is, then, necessary since the mind thinks upon all subjects, that it should  be homogeneous, in order, as Anaxagoras expresses himself, that it should domine, that is, recognise things; and as whatever is foreign to it precludes and eclipses its inward light, so it can have no other nature than that of potentiality. Thus, the so-called mind of Vital Principle (and by mind I mean that part  by which Vital Principle judges and compares), is not actually any one of the subjects of thought before