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 CH. II.] to be different from white, as both qualities must be apparent to some single faculty; for, otherwise, it would be as if I should perceive one quality and you perceive another, and thus make it evident that they are different from one another. But it is here required that the same individual should perceive that they are different, for the sweet is different from the white, and what he perceives that he says; and thus, what he says that he thinks and perceives. It is then evident that we cannot, by different senses, judge of different qualities, as also, from what follows, that we cannot judge of them in a separate portion of time. Neither can an opinion be in a separate portion of time; for just as it is the same individual who says that good is other than bad, so when he says that the one is different from the other, he implies that the other is equally so, and does not employ the term when loosely—he does not use it, I mean, in the sense of now, in the phrase, "now I say that the object is different," without implying that it is different now. But, here, it is the same individual who employs the term now, and says that objects are different now and because now; for the impressions are coincident, as they are inseparable, and as the time is indivisible. It cannot, however, be, that the same individual, in so far as indivisible, should be subject to contrary impulses in time which is indivisible; yet if sweetness move sensation or thought in one way, bitterness