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 132 that no sense can be wanting to us. But neither is it possible that there should be any special organ for the perception of common properties, (such as motion, rest, magnitude, form, number and unity), of which we are made sensible, by each special sense, accidentally; for we perceive all such by motion as we do magnitude, and as we do form, as form is a kind of magnitude; the state of rest we are sensible of by the absence of motion, and number we perceive by the want of continuity and by particular senses, for each sense is perceptive of unity. So that, evidently, there cannot be a peculiar sense for the perception of any one of those properties, as motion, for instance; with respect to which we shall be ever situated as we now are, when, by sight, we judge of something sweet. And this we are able to do from our happening to possess a sense which is perceptive of double impressions, and by the way in which those impressions coincide, we recognise what the thing is; were this not the case, then, in no wise, except by chance, could we perceive that the thing was sweet, any more than we could tell that an individual is the son of Cleon, not because he is really so, but because he is fair; and fairness is an accident pertaining to the son of Cleon. And yet we have a common sense for the perception of common properties and that not casually, although it is not a peculiar sense; for, were it so, then in no otherwise could we perceive those