Page:Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography (1900, volume 1).djvu/467

Rh of such vigor as might have averted the civil war; but the policy of Mr. Lincoln's administration, until after the attack on Fort Sumter, was identical with that of Mr. Buchanan. In his annual message of 5 Dec., 1860, Mr. Buchanan stated clearly and forcibly his denial of the right of secession, and also his conviction that if a state should adopt such an unconstitutional measure the federal government had no power, under the constitution, to make aggressive war upon her to compel her to remain in the union; but at the same time drawing a definite distinction between this and the right of the use of force against individuals, in spite of secession, in enforcing the execution of federal laws and in the preservation of federal property. This doctrine met the secessionists upon their own ground; for it denied that a state ordinance of secession could absolve its people from obeying the laws of the United States. Mr. Buchanan thus framed the only justifiable basis of a civil war, and left upon the records of the country the clear line of demarcation that would have to be observed by his successor and would make the use of force, if force must be used, a war, not of aggression, but of defence. In order to disarm all unreasonable opposition from the south, Mr. Buchanan urged upon congress the adoption of an &ldquo;explanatory amendment&rdquo; of the constitution, which should effectually secure to slave-holders all their constitutional rights. From all parts of the country, north and south, he received private letters approving, on various grounds, the tone of the message; but nearly the whole of the republican party saw fit to treat it as a denial by the president of any power to enforce the laws against the citizens of a state after secession, and even after actual rebellion; while this very power, emphatically stated as it was in the message, was made by the secessionists their ground of attack. It was the great misfortune of Mr. Buchanan's position that he had to appeal to a congress in which there were two sectional parties breathing mutual defiance; in which broad and patriotic statesmanship was confined to a small body of men, who could not win over to their views a sufficient number from either of the parties to make up a majority upon any proposition whatever. In the hope of preventing the secession of South Carolina, the president sent Caleb Cushing to Charleston, with a letter to Gov. Pickens, urging the people of the state to await the action of congress.

After the actual secession of South Carolina, Mr. Buchanan's two great objects were: 1. To confine the area of secession, so that if there was to be a southern confederacy it might comprehend only the cotton states, which were most likely to act together. 2. To induce congress to prepare for a civil war in case one should be precipitated. While he made it apparent to congress that at that time he was without the necessary executive powers to enforce the collection of the revenue in South Carolina, he did not fail to call for the appropriate powers and means. But at no time during that session did a single republican senator (and the republicans had a majority in the senate), in any form whatever, give his vote or his influence for any measure that would strengthen the hands of the president either in maintaining peace or in executing the laws of the United States. Whatever was the governing motive for their inaction, it never can be said that they were not seasonably warned by the president that a policy of inaction would be fatal. That policy not only crippled him, but crippled his successor. When Mr. Lincoln came into office, seven states had already seceded, and not a single law had been put upon the statute-book that would enable the executive to meet such a condition of the union. Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, had introduced into the senate a resolution, which became known as the &ldquo;Crittenden Compromise,&rdquo; providing in substance for a restoration of the Missouri compromise-line of 36&deg; 30'; and it was proposed that this question should be referred to a direct vote of the people in the several states. On 8 Jan., 1861, Mr. Buchanan sent a special message to congress, strongly recommending the adoption of this measure; but it produced no effect. During the last three months of his term there were several changes in his cabinet. Mr. Cobb resigned his portfolio on 8 Dec., 1860, and Mr. Thomas, who succeeded him as secretary of the treasury, also resigned on 11 Jan., their sympathies being with the secessionists. This department was then taken by Gen. John A. Dix. Mr. Thompson, secretary of the interior, resigned on 8 Jan., also because he was a southern man, and the duties of this office were subsequently per- formed by Moses Kelly, chief clerk. Gen. Cass and Gov. Floyd resigned their offices in December; Judge Black was transferred from the attorney-generalship to the state department, and Edwin M. Stanton became attorney-general. Joseph Holt succeeded Sec. Floyd in the war department.

The two critical questions which it was important that the president should correctly and consistently decide were, whether he was to receive in their assumed official character any commissioners sent by the southern states as to a foreign power, and whether re-enforcements should be sent to Maj. Anderson at Fort Sumter, or to any other southern fort. Mr. Buchanan always refused to receive both the South Carolina commissioners and also Mr. Crawford, the first of the commissioners from the confederate government at Montgomery, who arrived in Washington just before the close of his term; he thus left the new president entirely free to act as he saw best, and entirely untrammelled by any previous pledges. As to re-enforcements for southern forts, Maj. Anderson was instructed to report to the government any necessity for assistance, and in the mean time an expedition was fitted out at New York and held in readiness to sail at an hour's notice. Until the close of Mr. Buchanan's administration, Maj. Anderson considered himself sufficiently strong, and agreed with the president that any unnecessary movement of troops would be regarded by the south as a menace and would provoke hostilities. Mr. Buchanan would not initiate a civil war; his policy was entirely defensive; and yet he did all that he could, constitutionally, to avert a war. It has often been asked, Why did Mr. Buchanan suffer state after state to go out of the union? Why did he not call on the north for volunteers, and put down rebellion in its first stage? The president had no power to call for volunteers under any existing law; congress, during the whole winter, refused to pass any law to provide him with men or money. In the application of all the means that he had for protecting the public property, he omitted no step that could have been taken with safety, and, at the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, Maj. Anderson not only held Fort Sumter, but had held it down to that time in perfect confidence that he could maintain his position.

On 9 March, 1861, Mr. Buchanan returned to his home at Wheatland, a view of which appears on page 432, rejoicing to be free from the cares of a long and responsible public life, and welcomed by an immense gathering of his