Page:Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography (1892, volume 3).djvu/708

670 pose of his forces as to put Washington in actual or seeming danger, he was confident that McClel- lan's army would be speedily recalled.

In the mean time, Gen. John Pope, in command of another National army, had advanced by way of the Orange and Alexandria railroad, with the purpose of effecting a junction with McClellan, and it was necessary to meet the danger from that quarter without exposing Richmond, as already explained ; for if the people of the north laid ex- cessive stress upon the preservation of Washington from capture, the people of the south held Rich- mond in a like sentimental regard. Jackson was ordered, on 13 July, to Gordonsville with his own and Ewell's divisions, and he moved thence to Orange Court-House, where A. P. Hill was ordered to join him at the end of the month. With this force Jackson crossed the Rapidan, attacked a part of Pope's army at Cedar Mountain on 9 Aug., and gained an ad- vantage, hold- ing the ground until Pope ad- vanced in force two days later, when he retired to the south of the river. Lee now hurried troops forward as rapidly as possible, and on 14 Aug. took personal command on the Rapidan. His force was slightly superior to Pope's, and, as the National commander seemed at that time unaware of the presence of the main body of the Confederate army, Lee hoped, by a prompt attack, to take him somewhat unpre- fmred. The movement was planned for 19 Aug., >ut there was a delay of a day, and in the mean time Pope had become aware of his danger and withdrawn behind the Rappahannock, where he had posted his army in a strong position to oppose a crossing. Finding the advantage of position to be with the enemy, Lee moved up the river. Pope keeping pace with him until a point near Warren- ton Springs was reached. There Lee halted and made a demonstration as if to cross, on 24 Aug., while Jackson, crossing about eight miles above, made a rapid march around Bull Run Mountain and through Thoroughfare Gap, to gain the ene- my's rear. The movement was completely suc- cessful, and on the 26th Jackson reached Manassas Junction, capturing the supply depots there. As soon as Pope discovered the movement he with- drew to protect his communications. Longstreet at once marched to join Jackson, following the same route and effecting a junction on the morn- ing of 29 Aug.. on the same field on which the first battle, of Manassas or Bull Run was fought in 1861. Pope's army, re-enforced from McClellan's, was in position, and battle was joined that after- noon. The National assaults upon Lee's lines on that day and the next were determined but unsuc- cessful, and on 30 Aug. the Confederates succeeded in driving their enemy across Bull Run to Centre- ville. Lee, re-enforced, turned the position on 1 Sept., and Pope retired toward Washington. The way was now clear for the further offensive operations that Lee contemplated. The transfer of McClellan's invading force to Washington had been made imperative, and Lee's army, encouraged by success, was again filled with that confidence in itself and its leader which alone can make an army a fit tool with which to undertake aggressive en- terprises. He determined to transfer the scene of operations to the enemy's territory. The plan in- volved the practical abandonment of his commu- nications so far as the means of subsisting his army was concerned, but the region into which he planned to march was rich in food and forage, and, with the aid of his active cavalry under Stuart, he trusted to his ability to live upon the country. The move- ment was begun at once, and on 5 Sept. the army, 45,000 strong, crossed the Potomac and took up a position near Frederick, Md., from which it might move at will against Washington or Baltimore or invade Pennsylvania. A strong garrison of Na- tional troops still held Harper's Ferry, to Lee's surprise and somewhat to the disturbance of his plans, as it was necessaiy for him to have the route to the valley of Virginia open to his ammunition- trains. On 10 Sept., therefore, he directed Jackson to return to the south side of the river and advance upon Harper's Ferry from the direction of Martins- burg, while McLaws should seize Maryland Heights, Walker hold Loudon Heights, and D. H. Hill post himself at Boonsboro' Pass to prevent the escape of the garrison. Having made these dispositions, Lee moved to Hagerstown to collect subsistence and to await the capture of Harper's Ferry by his lieutenant, after which the several divisions were to unite at Boonsboro' or Sharpsburg, as occasion should determine.

McClellan was at this time advancing at the head of the National army from Washington, but with unusual deliberation. By one of those mishaps which play so large a part in military operations, a copy of Lee's order, giving minute details of his dispositions and plans, fell into McClellan's hands, and that general, thus fully apprised of the exact whereabouts of every subdivision of Lee's temporarily scattered forces, made haste to take advantage of his adversary's unprepared situation. Making a rapid march, on 14 Sept. he fell upon D. H. Hill's division at Boonsboro' Pass. Hill resisted stubbornly and held his ground until assistance arrived. During the night Lee withdrew to Sharpsburg, where news soon reached him of the surrender of Harper's Ferry with about 11.000 men and all its stores. By the 16th the army was again united, except that A. P. Hill's division had remained at Harper's Ferry to care for the prisoners and stores. Meantime McClellan had reached Sharpsburg also, and on the 17th battle was joined. (For an account of the battle, see McClellan.) Neither side having gained a decisive victory, neither was disposed to renew the contest on the 18th, and the day was fiassed in inactivity. During the night following jee recrossed the Potomac and marched to the neighborhood of Winchester, where he remained until late in October, the enemy also remaining inactive until that time, when Lee retired to the line of the Rappahannock. The conflict at Sharpsburg or Antietam is called a drawn battle, and it was such if we consider only the immediate result. Neither army overcame the other or gained a decisive advantage, and neither was in condition, at the end of the affair, to make effective pursuit should the other retire. But McClellan had had the best of it in the fight, and Lee's invasion of northern territory was brought to an end ; the battle was thus in effect a victory for the National