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420 He added these important words, which contain the most material article of his political creed: "Perhaps even this may sometimes err; but its errors are honest, solitary, and short-lived. Let us, then, forever bow down to the general reason of society. We are safe with that, even in its deviations, for it soon returns again to the right way." To other addresses of welcome he replied in a similar tone. He brought to New York a settled conviction that the republican is the only form of government that is not robbery and violence organized. Feeling thus, he was grieved and astonished to find a distrust of republican government prevalent in society, and to hear a preference for the monarchical form frequently expressed. In the cabinet itself, where Hamilton dominated and Knox echoed his opinions, the republic was accepted rather as a temporary expedient than as a final good. Jefferson and Hamilton, representing diverse and incompatible tendencies, soon found themselves in ill-accord, and their discussions in the cabinet became vehement. They differed in some degree upon almost every measure of the administration, and on several of the most vital their differences became passionate and distressing. In May, 1791, by openly accepting and eulogizing Thomas Paine's "Rights of Man," a spirited reply to Burke's "Reflections on the Revolution in France," Jefferson placed himself at the head of the Republican party in the United States. The difference between the two chief members of the cabinet rapidly developed into a personal antipathy, and both of them ardently desired to withdraw. Both, however, could have borne these disagreeable dissensions, and we see in their later letters that the real cause of their longing to resign was the insufficiency of their salaries. Jefferson's estate, much diminished by the war, was of little profit to him in the absence of the master's eye. Gen. Washington, who did equal justice to the merits of both these able men, used all his influence and tact to induce them to remain, and, yielding to the president's persuasions, both made an honest attempt at external agreement. But in truth their feelings, as well as their opinions, were naturally irreconcilable. Their attitude toward the French revolution proves this. Hamilton continually and openly expressed an undiscriminating abhorrence of it, while Jefferson deliberately wrote that if the movement "had desolated half the earth," the evil would have been less than the continuance of the ancient system. Writing to an old friend he went farther even than this: "Were there but an Adam and an Eve left in every country, and left free, it would be better than as it now is." On every point of difficulty created by the French revolution the disagreement between the two secretaries was extreme. On other subjects there was little real concord, and it was a happy moment for both when, on 1 Jan., 1794, President Washington accepted Jefferson's resignation. He left office at a fortunate time for his reputation, since his correspondence with the English plenipotentiary, George Hammond, and the French plenipotentiary, Edmond Genet, had just been published in a large pamphlet. Jefferson's letters to those gentlemen were so moderate, so just, and so conciliatory as to extort the approval of his opponents. Chief-Justice Marshall, an extreme Federalist, remarks, in his "Life of Washington," that this correspondence lessened the hostility of Jefferson's opponents without diminishing the attachment of his friends. Five days after his release from office he set out for home, having been secretary of state three years and ten months.

All his interest in the cultivation of the soil now returned to him, and he supposed his public life ended forever. In September, 1794, after the retirement of Hamilton from the cabinet, Washington invited Jefferson to go abroad as special envoy to Spain; but he declined, declaring that "no circumstances would evermore tempt him to engage in anything public." Nevertheless, in 1796, Washington having refused to serve a third term in the presidency, he allowed his name to be used as that of a candidate for the succession. The contest was embittered by the unpopularity of the Jay treaty with Great Britain. Jefferson had desired the rejection of the treaty, and he remained always of the opinion that by its rejection the government of the United States might at length have secured "a respect for our neutral rights" without a war. Jefferson had a narrow escape from being elected to the presidency in 1796. John Adams received seventy-one electoral votes, and Jefferson sixty-eight, a result that, as the law then stood, gave him the vice-presidency. In view of the duties about to devolve upon him, he began to prepare, chiefly for his own guidance in the chair of the senate, his "Manual of Parliamentary Practice," a code that still substantially governs all our deliberative bodies. He deeply felt the importance of such rules, believing that when strictly enforced they operated as a check on the majority, and gave "shelter and protection to the minority against the attempts of power." Jefferson much enjoyed the office of vice-president, partly from the interest he took in the art of legislation and partly because his presidency of the Philosophical society brought him into agreeable relations with the most able minds of the

country. He took no part whatever in the administration of the government, as Mr. Adams ceased to consult him on political measures almost immediately after his inauguration. The administration of Adams, so turbulent and eventful, inflamed party spirit to an extreme degree. The reactionary policy of Hamilton and his friends had full scope, as is shown by the passage of the alien and sedition laws, and by the warlike preparations against France. During the first three years Jefferson endeavored in various ways to influence the public mind, and thus to neutralize in some degree the active and aggressive spirit of Hamilton. He was clearly of opinion that the allien [sic] and sedition laws were not merely unconstitutional, but were so subversive of fundamental human rights as to justify a nullification of them. The Kentucky resolutions of 1798, in which his abhorrence of those laws was expressed, were originally drawn by him at the request of James Madison and Col. W. C. Nicholas. "These gentlemen," Jefferson once wrote, "pressed me strongly to sketch resolutions against the constitutionality of those laws." In consequence he drew and delivered them to Col. Nicholas, who introduced them into the legislature of Kentucky, and kept the secret of their authorship. These resolutions, read in the light of the events of 1798, will not now be disapproved by any person of republican convictions; they remain, and will long remain, one of the most interesting and valuable