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Rh other financial schemes, and ended with the precau- tionary words : " I shall be ready to concur with you in the adoption of such system as you may propose, reserving to myself the ultimate power of reject- ing any measure which may, in my view of it, con- flict with the constitution or otherwise jeopard the prosperity of the country, a power which I could not part with, even if I would, but which I will not believe any act of yours will call into requisi- tion." Congress disregarded the warning. The ground was cleared for action by a bill for abol- ishing Van Buren's sub-treasury system, which passed both houses and was signed by the presi- dent. But an amendment offered by Mr. Clay, for the repeal of the law of 1836 regulating the deposits in the state banks, was defeated by the votes of a small party led by William C. Rives. The great question then came up. On constitu- tional grounds, Mr. Tyler's objection to the United States bank had always been .that congress had no power to create such a corporation within the limits of a state without the consent of the state ascertained beforehand. He did not deny, how- ever, the power of congress to establish a district bank for the District of Columbia, and, provided the several states should consent, there seemed to be no reason why this district bank should not set up its branch offices all over the country. Mr. Clay's so-called "fiscal bank" bill of 1841 did not make proper provision for securing the assent of the states, and on that ground Mr. Rives proposed an amendment substituting a clause of a bill suggested by Thomas Ewing, secretary of the treasury, to the effect that such assent should • be formally secured. Mr. Rives's amendment was supported not only by several "state-rights Whigs," but also by senators Richard H. Bayard and Rufus Choate, and other friends of Mr. Web- ster. If adopted, its effect would have been con- ciliatory, and it might perhaps have averted for a moment the rupture between the ill-yoked allies. The Democrats, well aware of this, voted against the amendment, and it was lost. The bill incor- porating the fiscal bank of the United States was then passed by both houses, and on 16 Aug. was vetoed. An attempt to pass the bill over the veto failed of the requisite two-third majority.

The Whig leaders had already shown a disposi- tion to entrap the president. Before the passage of Mr. Clay's bill, John Minor Botts was sent to the White House with a private suggestion for a compromise. Mr. Tyler refused to listen to the suggestion except with the understanding that, should it meet with his disapproval, he should not hear from it again. The suggestion turned out to be a proposal that congress should authorize the establishment of branches of the district bank in any state of which the legislature at its very next session should not expressly refuse its consent to any such proceeding ; and that, moreover, in case the interests of the public should seem to require it, even such express refusal might be disregarded and overridden. By this means the obnoxious in- stitution might first be established in the Whig states, and then forced upon the Democratic states in spite of themselves. The president indignantly rejected the suggestion as "a contemptible subter- fuge, behind which he would not skulk." The de- vice, nevertheless, became incorporated in Mr. Clay's bill, and it was pretended that it was put there in order to smooth the way for the presi- dent to adopt the measure, but that in his un- reasonable obstinacy he refused to avail himself of the opportunity. After his veto of 16 Aug. these tortuous methods were renewed. Messengers went to and fro between the president and members of his cabinet on the one hand, and leading Whig members of congress on the other, conditional assurances were translated into the indicative mood, whispered messages were magnified and distorted, and pres- ently appeared upon the scene an outline of a bill that it was assumed the president would sign. This new measure was known as the " fiscal corpo- ration " bill. Like the fiscal bank bill, it created a bank in the District of Columbia, with branches throughout the states, and it made no proper pro- vision for the consent of the states. The president had admitted that a " fiscal agency " of the United States government, established in Washington for the purpose of collecting, keeping, and disbursing • the public revenue, was desirable if not indispensa- ble ; a regular bank of discount, engaged in com- mercial transactions throughout the states, and having the United States government as its prin- cipal share-holder and Federal officers exerting a controlling influence upon its directorship, was an entirely different affair — something, in his opinion, neither desirable nor permissible. In the " fiscal corporation" bill an attempt was made to hood- wink the president and the public by a pretence of forbidding discounts and loans and limiting the operations of the fiscal agency exclusively to ex- changes. While this project was maturing, the Whig newspapers fulminated with threats against the president in case he should persist in his course ; Erivate letters warned him of plots to assassinate im, and Mr. Clay in the senate referred to his res- ignation in 1836, and asked why, if constitutional scruples again hindered him from obeying the will of the people, did he not now resign his lofty posi- tion and leave it for those who could be more com- pliant? To this it was aptly replied by Mr. Rives that " the president was an independent branch of the government as well as congress, and was not called upon to resign because he differed in opin- ion with them." Some of the Whigs seem really to have hoped that such a storm could be raised as would browbeat the president into resigning, whereby the government would be temporarily left in the hands of William L. Southard, then president pro tempore of the senate. But Mr. Tyler was neither to be hoodwinked nor bullied. The " fiscal corporation " bill was passed by the senate on Saturday, 4 Sept., 1841 ; on Thursday, the 9th, the president's veto message was received ; on Saturday, the 11th, Thomas Ewing, secretary of the treasury, John Bell, secretary of war, George E. Badger, secretary of the navy, John J. Critten- den, attorney-general, and Francis Granger, post- master-general, resigned their places. The ad- journment of congress had been fixed for Monday, the 13th, and it was hoped that, suddenly con- fronted by a unanimous resignation of the cabinet and confused by want of time in which to appoint a new cabinet, the president would give up the game. But the resignation was not unanimous, for Daniel Webster, secretary of state, remained at his post, and on Monday morning the president nominated Walter Forward, of Pennsylvania, for secretary of the treasury; John McLean, of Ohio, for secretary of war; Abel P. Upshur, of Virginia, for secretary of the navy; Hugh S. Legare, of South Carolina, for attorney-general ; and Charles A. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, for postmaster-general. These appointments were duly confirmed.

Whether the defection of Mr. Webster at this moment would have been so fatal to the president as some of the Whigs were inclined to believe, may well be doubted, but there can be no doubt that his adherence to the president was of great value.