Page:Ante-Nicene Christian Library Vol 3.djvu/396

384, who is now present. This, then, was the purport of yesterday's discussion: that all things that we see, inasmuch as they consist in a certain proportion, and art, and form, and species, must be believed to have been made by intelligent power; but if it be mind and reason that has formed them, it follows that the world is governed by the providence of the same reason, although the things which are done in the world may seem to us to be not quite rightly done. But it follows, that if God and mind is the creator of all things. He must also be just; but if He is just, He necessarily judges. If He judges, it is of necessity that men be judged with respect to their doings; and if every one is judged in respect of his doings, there shall at some time be a righteous separation between righteous men and sinners. This, I think, was the substance of the whole discourse.

"If, therefore, it can be shown that mind and reason created all things, it follows that those things which come after are also managed by reason and providence. But if unintelligent and blind nature produces all things, the reason of judgment is undoubtedly overthrown; and there is no ground to expect either punishment of sin or reward of well-doing where there is no judge. Since, then, the whole matter depends upon this, and hangs by this head, do not take it amiss if I wish this to be discussed and handled somewhat more fully. For in this the first gate, as it were, is shut towards all things which are propounded, and therefore I wish first of all to have it opened to me. Now therefore hear what my doctrine is; and if any one of you pleases, let him reply to me: for I shall not be ashamed to learn, if I hear that which is true, and to assent to him who speaks rightly. The discourse, then, which you delivered yesterday, which asserted that all things consist by art, and measure, and reason, does not fully persuade me that it is mind and reason that has made the world; for I have many things which I can show to consist by competent measure, and form, and species, and which yet were not made by mind and reason. Then, besides, I see