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214 now it is realised that it is simple justice that the poor should have old-age pensions. Justice is not inconsistent with sympathy. Justice must, indeed, be impartial, and if a man allows sympathy to get the better of his judgment, he is not really just; but an impartial sympathy is possible, and seems indeed to be of the essence of social justice.

§6. Wisdom. The virtue of wisdom should perhaps be regarded as the foundation of all the virtues rather than as a virtue in itself. There would seem to be no virtue without some wisdom or knowledge. We have pointed out that reason forms the basis of moral judgment, and that every right action involves some awareness or knowledge or conscientiousness in its performance.

The two aspects of wisdom of greatest importance in connection with virtue are insight and reflection. The wise man is the man of insight. In treating of duty, we pointed out that the value of moral rules is very limited: they must be applied by the man of insight who has a conscientious attitude to life. Moral insight is one of the most distinctive marks of the good man. The other ethically valuable aspect of wisdom is reflection. Virtuous action is not simply a matter of insight. Morality, as we have seen, involves reflection. All good moral actions are voluntary, either in the sense that they are definitely willed, or that they are performed in accordance with habits which have been formed by the repetition of willed actions. And every voluntary action involves reflection and thoughtfulness. The virtuous man does not act in obedience to every impulse and in order to enjoy