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 his time, it still remains the most satisfactory. But we should remember that such a list is simply a statement of different aspects of goodness of character and conduct. All or none of these aspects of goodness may be exhibited by an action. The same act may be at once courageous, temperate, wise, and just. In such a case all the chief aspects of goodness are possessed by it. On the other hand, a courageous act may be unwise and intemperate and unjust, and a wise action may be neither courageous nor just. It is difficult sometimes to decide whether a man's character or conduct is good, precisely because it may exhibit one or more aspects of goodness without the others.

But, in general, the man who engages seriously in the struggle of morality tends to develop all the virtues harmoniously. The cardinal virtues are systematic, and real goodness of character expresses itself equally and naturally in all of them. The good character expresses itself whole-heartedly and impartially in its actions—and that is justice; it exhibits fortitude and perseverance—and that is courage; it exercises self-control in all things—and that is temperance; and its conduct shows insight, reflection and deliberation—and that is wisdom. The virtues appear only in actual conduct. They are not inert possessions of the self. They really exist only in activity of some kind. "No man," Aristotle said, "is virtuous in his sleep." A virtue is always an activity of character, an activity exercised in some department of the struggle of the moral life. Courage could not exist, were it not for the difficult and dangerous situations which call for