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 identified himself with a noble cause, so that this becomes his real self, often finds that his loyalty to his vocation conflicts with the interests of his private self or with the desires of that self. In such cases it is usually right for him to "practise self-denial," not in the sense that he denies his comprehensive self; but that, in order to assert it, it is necessary to sacrifice some of the lower aspects of the self.

The moral education of character depends very largely, as we have seen, on the success with which desires are organised and harmonised. Unworthy desires have to be repressed and unworthy interests sacrificed. This is what ordinary speech means by "self-denial." Self-denial in this sense is essential to the progress of the moral life. But it is important to notice that what is denied is not the true self, but some part of the self which is conceived to be at variance with the true self. And so, when a man denies himself for the sake of his family or country or the kingdom of God, what he does is to sacrifice those interests which are private to his individual self, for the sake of that more comprehensive self (family or church or state) which in his best moments he regards as his real self.

It is this real self that is to be asserted. It is mischievous to try to assert some one fragmentary aspect of the self. If that be done, it is always at the expense of the self as a whole. Those who speak most about their rights of self-assertion in the narrow individualist sense, do not realise that the reason why the matter occupies so much of their attention is precisely that they have no self to assert. As we say, they do not know what to do with themselves. They