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 contain the greatest amount of pleasure possible under the circumstances? If it does, it is right. If it does not, it is wrong. Now this standard seems at first sight a delightfully simple one to apply. If three courses of action are open to me, one of which contains 2 units of pleasure, another 3, another 4, then the right course of action is that which contains 4 units of pleasure, because 4>3, and 4>2. But if it were possible to combine the first two courses of action, then the combined course is right, because 3 + 2 > 4. Now, all this sounds very simple. But as soon as we examine the standard a little more closely, we find that it is, in reality, very complicated indeed.

In the first place, how are we to calculate the quantitative value of pleasures? Suppose at a particular juncture two courses of action are open to us, how are we to decide which is the more pleasant? Bentham answered that these lines of conduct should be considered in various aspects, with regard to (a) the intensity of the pleasures connected with them, (b) their duration, (c) their certainty, (d) their nearness or remoteness, (e) their fecundity, i.e. their tendency to produce other pleasures, (f) their purity, i.e. their freedom from pain, and (g) their extent, i.e. the number of persons who are affected by them. The values of the pleasures under all these heads should be summed up, and the pains deducted. This process should be repeated for every possible course of action, and that line of conduct which at the end stands highest in value is the right action. But it is very evident that it is impossible to give numerical values to pleasures,