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 an evil action only because he fears the physical consequences of it, or the legal penalties which it involves, or the social unpopularity which it will reflect upon him, or the pains which religion attaches to it, is not really good. He has abstained from the wrong act, not because it is wrong, not because his character is good and abhors it, but solely because he fears the consequences of the action.

(2) Actions which are done in obedience to the external sanctions of morality, and in accordance with the rules which they imply, may be outwardly indistinguishable from right actions, but they are not right. If a suburban lady gives half-a-crown to a charitable institution simply because all the other ladies in the Terrace do so, she is acting in obedience to the external social sanction, and her action has no moral worth. Her action would be right only if the motive were good, i.e. only if she felt sympathy with the institution, and gave her half-crown in order that it might contribute to the realisation of that aim. Actions are not right because they conform to some moral rule. They are right only if they are the expressions of a good character and are prompted by good motives.

The sanctions of morality, as we have seen, are attempts to answer the question, "Why should I be good?" And we have also seen that no sanction can give a satisfactory answer to this question. The only sound answer to the question, "Why should I be good?" is, "Because it is good to be good." Good conduct is its own sufficient justification. Morality contains in itself its own sanctions. To the man of good character, his own approval is the