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 can be so, only when it is definitely rational. Only when we deliberately reflect can we counteract the perverting influences of feeling.

(4) Finally, moral judgments must be authoritative. They should be made by the self as a whole, and have behind them not only the weight of the whole self, but also the authority of Reason. As we have seen, conscience is simply the self regarded as passing moral judgments, and conscience has absolute authority because it is the rational self. The free and rational self is, in the fullest sense, the author of its actions and its judgments. But its judgments are not completely authoritative, unless they are in accordance with the authority of Reason.

On all these grounds we conclude that moral judgment is essentially rational judgment. If a moral judgment is to satisfy the demands of objectivity, universality, impartiality, and authoritativeness, it must be based on reason. We have traced the evolution of moral judgment from its earliest beginnings in the life of the child, and have found that unless the judgment be based on reason it cannot be valid. This is an important conclusion.

For further reading: H. Rashdall: Theory of Good and Evil, vol. i. ch. vi.; J. M. Baldwin: Social and Ethical Interpretations, ch. iii. and vi.; G. E. Moore: Ethics, ch. iii. and iv.