Page:An introduction to ethics.djvu/152

 wrong standard. But each was using his own feeling as the standard. Now all moral judgments based on a true moral standard are consistent. Hence such conflicts as this show that feeling cannot be the moral standard.

Feeling is inadequate as the basis of moral judgment for two reasons. (1) Feelings are essentially private. A man's feelings are his, and though he can describe them to others, they cannot really share them. Men differ in nothing so much as their feelings. A man's feelings are secret: he knows that nobody in the world knows all about his feelings, and he cannot assume that he knows all about any other person's feelings. Now the standard of moral judgment must be public; it must be common to all men, and alike for all men.

(2) Feelings are essentially transient. A man's feelings are the most variable part of him. His whole feeling-attitude may change many times in a single day. Even his feelings of moral approval and disapproval, which are generally less capricious than the rest of his feeling-self, are affected by the sudden alterations that take place in his feeling-disposition. But, as we have already seen, the standard of moral judgment must be something constant, permanent, and consistent.

§ 5. The Standard as Reason. When we reflect, we see that moral judgment must be based on reason. Our moral judgments, in fact, are rational in precisely the same way as any of our other judgments. All judgment is rational, and moral judgments differ from all other judgments, not in the actual mental process of judging, but in the object of