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 only to Ideas, derived from the Body, and the Operations of the Mind about them, or else that the Soul remembers something that the Man does not.

§. 18. I would be glad also to learn from these men, who so confidently pronounce, that the humane Soul, or, which is all one, that a man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, how they come to know that they themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it. This, I am afraid, is to be sure, without proofs; and to know, without perceiving: 'Tis, I suspect, a confused Notion, taken up to serve an Hypothesis; and none of those clear Truths, that either their own Evidence force us to admit, or common Experience makes it impudence to deny. For the most that can be said of it, is, That 'tis possible the Soul may always think, but not always retain it in memory: And, I say, it is as possible, that the Soul may not always think; and much more probable, that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to it self the next moment after, that it had thought.

§. 19. To suppose the Soul to think, and the Man not perceive it, is, as has been said, to make two persons in one man: And if one consider well these mens way of speaking, one shall be lead into a suspicion, that they do so. For they who tell us, that the Soul always thinks, do never, that I remember, say, That a man always thinks. Can the Soul think, and not the Man? Or a Man think, and not be conscious of it? This, perhaps, would be suspected of Jargon in others. If they say, The man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it; they may as well say, His Body is extended, without having parts. For 'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that any thing is extended without parts, as that any thing thinks, without being conscious of it; without perceiving, that it does so. They who talk thus, may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their Hypothesis, say, That a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it: Whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say, That a man is always conscious to himself of thinking; I ask, How they know it? Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind. Can another man perceive, that I am conscious of any thing, when I perceive it not my self? No man's Knowledge here, can go beyond his Experience. Wake a man out of a sound sleep, and ask him, What he was that moment thinking on. If he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable Diviner of Thoughts, that can assure him, that he was thinking: May he not with more reason assure him, he was not asleep? This is something beyond Philosophy; and it cannot be less than Revelation, that discovers to another, Thoughts in my mind, when I can find none there my self: And they must needs have a penetrating sight, who can certainly see, that I think, when I cannot perceive it my self, and declare, That I do not; and yet can see, that a Dog, or an Elephant, do not think, though they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us, that they do so. This some may suspect to be a step beyond the Rosecrucians; it seeming easier to make ones self invisible to others, than to make another's thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But 'tis but defining the Soul to be a substance, that always thinks, and the business is done. If such a definition be of any Authority, I know not what it can serve for, but to make many men suspect, That they have no Souls at all, since they find a good part of their Lives pass away without thinking. For no Definitions, that I know, no Suppositions of any Sect, are of force enough to destroy constant Experience; and, perhaps,