Page:An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding - Locke (1690).djvu/54

RV 38 (Chap IV.) soning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own Minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in our selves, do from these receive into our Understanding, as distinct Ideas, as we do from Bodies affecting our Senses. This Source of Ideas, every Man has wholly in himself: And though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd internal Sense. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this REFLECTION, the Ideas it affords being such only, as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within it self. By REFLECTION then, in the following part of this Discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof, there come to be Ideas of these Operations in the Understanding. These two, I say, viz. External, Material things, as the Objects of SENSATION; and the Operations of our own Minds within, as the Objects of REFLECTION, are, to me, the only Originals, from whence all our Idea's take their beginnings. The term Operations here, I use in a large sence, as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about its Ideas, but some sort of Passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

§. 5. The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least glimmering of any Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two: Eternal Objects furnish the Mind with the Ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produced in us: And the Mind furnishes the Understanding with Ideas of its own Operations. These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, and the Compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly search into his Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original Ideas he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his Senses, or of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his Reflection: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any Idea in his Mind, but what one of those two have imprinted; though, perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged, by the Understanding, as we shall see hereafter.

§. 6. He that attentively considers the state of a Child, at his first coming into the World, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of Ideas, that are to be the matter of his future Knowledge. 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furnished with them: And though the Ideas of obvious and familiar qualities, imprint themselves, before the Memory begins to keep a Register of Time and Order, yet 'tis often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way, that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them: And if it were worth while, no doubt a Child might be so ordered, as to have but a very few, even of the ordinary Ideas, till he were grown up to a Man. But being surrounded with Bodies, that perpetually and diversly affect us, variety of Idea's, whether care be taken about it, or no, are imprinted on the Minds of Children. Light, and Colours, are busie and at hand everywhere, when the Eye is but open; Sounds, and some tangible Qualities, fail not to sollicite their proper Senses, and force an entrance to the Mind; but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, That if a Child were kept in a place, where he never saw any other but Black and White, till he were a Man,