Page:An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding - Locke (1690).djvu/49

RV 33 (Chap IV.) of God Himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the Goodness of God, that he has given us Minds unfurnished with these Idea's of Himself, than that he hath sent us into the World, with Bodies uncloathed; and that there is no Art or Skill born with us. For being fitted with Faculties to attain these, it is want of Industry, and Consideration in us, and not of Bounty in Him, if we have them not. 'Tis as certain, that there is a God, as that the opposite Angles, made by the intersection of two strait Lines, are equal. There was never any rational Creature, that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these Propositions, that could fail to assent to them: Though yet it be past doubt, that there are many Men, who having not applied their Thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) universal Consent, such an one I easily allow: But such an universal Consent as this, proves not the Idea of God, no more than it does the Idea of such Angles, innate.

§. 17. Since then though the knowledge of a GOD, be the most natural discovery of humane Reason, yet the Idea of him, is not innate, as, I think, is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scarce any other Idea found, that can pretend to it: since if God had left any natural impressions on the Understanding of Men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some Characters of Himself, as far as our weak Capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an Object. But our Minds being, at first, void of that Idea, which we are most concerned to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate Characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.

§. 18. I confess, there is another Idea, which would be of general use for Mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the Idea of Substance, which we neither have, nor can have, by Sensation or Reflection. If Nature took care to provide us any Idea's, we might well expect it should be such, as by our own Faculties we cannot procure to ourselves: But we see on the contrary, that since by those ways, whereby other Ideas are brought into our Minds, this is not, We have no such clear Idea at all, and therefore signifie nothing by the word Substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what; i. e. of something whereof we have no Idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those Idea's we do know.

§. 19. Whatever then we talk of innate, either speculative, or practical, Principles, it may, with as much probability, be said, That a Man hath a 100 l. sterling in his pocket, and yet deny that he hath there either Penny, Shilling, Crown, or any other Coin, out of which the Sum is to be made up; as to think, that certain Propositions are innate, when the Idea's about which they are, can by no means be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that is given, doth not at all prove, that the Idea's expressed in them, are innate: For in many cases, however the Idea's came there, the assent to Words expressing the agreement, or disagreement, of such Idea's, will necessarily follow. Every one that hath a true Idea of God, and Worship, will assent to this Proposition, That God is to be worshipped, when expressed in a Language he understands: And every rational Man, that hath not thought on it to day, may be ready to assent to this Proposition to morrow; and yet millions of Men may be well supposed to want one, or both, of those Idea's to day: For if we will allow Savages, and most Country-people, to have Idea's of God and Worship (which conversation with them, will not make one forward to