Page:An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding - Locke (1690).djvu/46

RV 30 (Chap IV.) it far and wide; and continue it down to all Generations: though yet the general reception of this Name, and some imperfect and unsteady Notions, conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of Mankind, prove not the Idea to be innate; but only that they, who made the Discovery, had made a right use of their Reason, thought maturely of the Causes of things, and traced them to their Original; from whom other less considering People, having once received so important a Notion, it could not easily be lost again.

§. 11. This is all could be inferr'd from the Notion of a God, were it to be found universally in all the Tribes of Mankind, and generally acknowledged, by Men grown to maturity in all Countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no farther than that; which if it be sufficient to prove the Idea of God, innate, will as well prove the Idea of Fire, innate; since, I think, it may truly be said, That there is not a Person in the World, who has a Notion of a God, who has not also the Idea of Fire. I doubt not, but if a Colony of young Children should be placed in an Island, where no Fire was, they would certainly neither have any Notion of such a thing, nor Name for it, how generally soever it were received, and known in all the World besides; and, perhaps too, their Apprehensions, would be as far removed from any Name, or Notion of a God, till some one amongst them had imployed his Thoughts, to enquire into the Constitution and Causes of things, which would easily lead him to the Notion of a God; which having once taught to others, Reason, and the natural Propensity of their own Thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

§. 12. Indeed it is urged, That it is suitable to the goodness of God, to imprint upon the Minds of Men, Characters and Notions of himself, and not leave them in the dark, and doubt, in so grand a Concernment; and also by that means, to secure to himself the Homage and Veneration, due from so intelligent a Creature as Man; and therefore he has done it.

This Argument, if it be of any Force, will prove much more than those, who use it, in this case, expect from it. For if we may conclude, that God hath done for Men, all that Men shall judge is best for them, because it is suitable to his goodness so to do, it will prove, not only, that God has imprinted on the minds of Men an Idea of himself; but that he hath plainly stamped there, in fair Characters, all that men ought to know, or believe of him, all that they ought to do in obedience to his Will; and that he hath given them a Will and Affection conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think it better for men, than that they should, in the dark, grope after Knowledge, as St. Paul tells us all Nations did after God, Acts XVII.27. than that their Wills should clash with their Understandings, and their Appetites cross their Duty. The Romanists say, 'Tis best for men, and so, suitable to the goodness of God, that there should be an infallible Judge of Controversies on Earth; and therefore there is one: and I, by the same Reason, say, 'Tis better for men, that every man himself should be infallible. I leave them to consider, whether by the force of this Argument they shall think that every man is so. I think it a very good Argument, to say, the infinitely wise God hath made it so: And therefore it is best. But it seems to me a little too much Confidence of our own Wisdom, to say, I think it best, and therefore God hath made it so; and in the matter in Hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a Topick, that God hath done so, when certain Experience shews us, that he hath not. But the Goodness of God hath not been wanting to men without such Original Impressions of Knowledge, or Idea's stamped on the mind: since he