Page:An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding - Locke (1690).djvu/31

RV 15 (Chap III.)

F those speculative Maxims, whereof we discoursed in the fore-going Chapter, have not an actual universal assent from all Mankind, as we there proved, it is much more visible concerning practical Principles, that they come short of an universal Reception: and I think it will be hard to instance any one moral Rule, which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as, What is, is, or to be so manifest a Truth as this, That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be. Whereby it is evident, That they are farther removed from a title to be innate; and the doubt of their being native Impressions on the Mind, is stronger against these moral Principles than the other. Not that it brings their Truth at all in question. They are equally true, though not equally evident. Those speculative Maxims carry their own Evidence with them: but moral Principles require Reasoning and Discourse, and some Exercise of the Mind, to discover the Certainty of their Truth. They lie not open as natural Characters ingraven on the Mind; which if any such were, they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to every Body. But this is no Derogation to their Truth and Certainty, no more than it is to the Truth or Certainty of the Three Angles of a Triangle being equal to two right ones, because it is not so evident as The whole is bigger than a part; nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing. It may suffice, that these moral Rules are capable of Demonstration: and therefore it is our own faults, if we come not to a certain Knowledge of them. But the Ignorance wherein many Men are of them, and the slowness of assent wherewith others receive them, are manifest Proofs that they are not innate, and such as offer themselves to their view without searching.

§. 2. Whether there be any such moral Principles, wherein all Men do agree, I appeal to any, who have been but moderately conversant in the History of Mankind, and look'd abroad beyond the Smoak of their own Chimneys. Where is that practical Truth, that is universally received without doubt or question, as it must be if innate? Justice, and keeping of Contracts, is, that which most Men seem to agree in. This is a Principle, which is thought to extend it self to the Dens of Thieves, and the Troops of Robbers; and they who have gone farthest towards the putting off of Humanity it self, keep Faith and Rules of Justice one with another. I grant that Outlaws themselves do this one amongst another: but 'tis, without receiving these as the innate Laws of Nature. They practice them as Rules of convenience within their own Communities: But it is impossible to conceive, that he imbraces Justice as a practical Principle, who acts fairly with his Fellow-High-way-men, and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest Man he meets with. Justice and Truth are the common ties of Society; and therefore, even Outlaws and Villains, who break with all the World besides, must keep Faith and Rules of Equity amongst themselves, or else they cannot hold together. But will any one say, That those that live by Fraud and Rapine, have innate Principles of Truth and Justice, which they allow and assent to?

§. 3. Perhaps it will be urged, That the tacit assent of their Minds agrees to what their Practice contradicts. I answer, First, I have always