Page:An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding - Locke (1690).djvu/28

RV 12 (Chap II.) and then to Propositions, made in such Terms, whose signification we have learnt, and wherein the Agreement or Disagreement we can perceive in our Idea's, when put together, is expressed, we at first hearing assent; though to other Propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning Idea's, not so soon nor easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For though a Child quickly assent to this Proposition, That an Apple is not Fire; when, by familiar Acquaintance, he has got the Idea's of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his Mind, and has learnt that the Names Apple and Fire stand for them: yet, it will be some years after, perhaps, before the same Child will assent to this Proposition, That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be. Because, that though, perhaps, the Words are as easie to be learnt: yet, the signification of them, being more large, comprehensive, and abstract, than of the Names annexed to those sensible things, the Child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his Mind those general Idea's, they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any Child assent to a Proposition, made up of such general Terms: But as soon as ever he has got those Idea's, and learn'd their Names, he forwardly closes with the one, as well as the other of the forementioned Propositions; and with both for the same Reason; (viz.) because he finds the Idea's he has in his Mind, to agree or disagree, according as the Words standing for them, are affirmed, or denied one of another in the Proposition. But if Propositions be brought to him in Words, which stand for Idea's he has not yet in his Mind: to such Propositions, however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant. For Words, being but empty sounds, any farther than they are signs of our Idea's, we cannot but assent to them, as they correspond to those Idea's we have, but no farther than that. But the shewing by what Steps and Ways Knowledge comes into our Minds, and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being the Business of the following Discourse, it may suffice to have only touched on it here, as one Reason, that made me doubt of those innate Principles.

§. 24. To conclude this Argument of universal Consent, I agree with these Defenders of innate Principles; That if they are innate, they must needs have universal assent. For that a Truth should be innate, and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these Men's own Confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to, by those who understand not the Terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard, nor thought of those Propositions; which I think, is at least one half of Mankind. But were the Number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby shew these Propositions not to be innate, if Children alone were ignorant of them.

§. 25. But that I may not be accused, to argue from the thoughts of Infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what passes in their Understandings, before they express it; I say next, That these two general Propositions are not the Truths, that first possess the Minds of Children; nor are antecedent to all acquired, and adventitious Notions: which if they were innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time, when Children begin to think, and their Words and Actions do assure us, that they do so. When therefore they are capable of Thought, of Knowledge, of As-