Page:An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding - Locke (1690).djvu/25

RV 9 (Chap II.) §. 16. A Child knows not that Three and Four are equal to Seven, till he comes to be able to count to Seven, and has got the Name and Idea of Equality and then upon the explaining those Words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the Truth of that Proposition. But neither does he then readily assent, because it is an innate Truth, nor was his Assent wanting, till then, because he wanted the Use of Reason; but the Truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has setled in his Mind the clear and distinct Idea's, that these Names stand for: And then, he knows the Truth of that Proposition, upon the same Grounds, and by the same means that he knew before, That a Rod and Cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same Grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, as we shall more fully shew hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general Idea's, about which those Maxims are; or to know the Signification of those general Terms that stand for them; or to put together in his Mind, the Idea's they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those Maxims, whose Terms, with the Idea's they stand for, being no more innate than those of a Cat or a Weesel, he must stay till Time and Observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a Capacity, to know the Truth of these Maxims, upon the first Occasion, that shall make him put together those Idea's in his Mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those Propositions. And therefore it is, That a Man knows that Eighteen and Nineteen, are equal to Thirty Seven by the same self-Evidence, that he knows One and Two to be equal to Three: Yet, a Child knows that, not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of Reason; but because the Idea's the Words Eighteen, Nineteen• and Thirty seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those, which are signify'd by One, Two, and Three.

§. 17. This Evasion therefore of general Assent, when Men come to the use of Reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those supposed-innate, and other Truths, that are afterwards acquired and learnt, Men have endeavoured to secure an universal Assent to those they call Maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to, as soon as proposed, and the Terms they are propos'd in, understood: Seeing all Men, even Children, as soon as they hear and understand the Terms, assent to these Propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since Men never fail, after they have once understood the Words, to acknowledge them for undoubted Truths, they would inferr, That certainly these Propositions were first lodged in the Understanding, which, without any teaching, the Mind, at very first Proposal, immediately closes with, and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

§. 18. In Answer to this, I demand whether ready assent, given to a Proposition upon first hearing, and understanding the Terms, be a certain mark of an innate Principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a Proof of them: If it be said, that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such Propositions to be innate, which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate Principles. For upon the same ground (viz.) of Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, That Men would have those Maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several Propositions about Numbers, to be innate, That One and Two are equal to Three, That Two and Two are equal to Four, and a multitude of other the like Propositions in Numbers, that every Body assents to, at first hearing, and understanding the Terms must have a place amongst these innate Axioms. Nor is this the