Page:An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding - Locke (1690).djvu/24

RV 8 (Chap II.) §. 14. But Secondly, were it true, that the precise time of their being known, and assented to, were, when Men come to the Use of Reason; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, as the Supposition of it self is false. For by what kind of Logick will it appear, that any Notion is Originally by Nature imprinted in the Mind in its first Constitution, because it comes first to be observed, and assented to, when a Faculty of the Mind, which has quite a distinct Province, begins to exert it self? And therefore, the coming to the use of Speech, if it were supposed the time, that these Maxims are first assented to (which it may be with as much Truth, as the time when Men come to the use of Reason) would be as good a Proof that they were innate, as to say they are innate because Men assent to them, when they come to the use of Reason. I agree then with these Men of innate Principles, that there is no Knowledge of these general and self-evident Maxims in the Mind, till it comes to the Exercise of Reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of Reason, is the precise time when they are first taken notice of; and that if it were, that it would prove them innate. All that can with any Truth be meant by this Proposition, That Men assent to them when they come to the use of Reason, is no more but this, That the making of general abstract Idea's, and the Understanding of general Names, being a Concomitant of the rational Faculty, and growing up with it, Children commonly get not those general Idea's, nor learn the Names that stand for them, till having for a good while exercised their Reason about familiar and more particular Idea's, they are by their ordinary Discourse and Actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational Conversation. If assenting to these Maxims, when Men come to the use of Reason, can be true in any other Sence, I desire it may be shewn; or at least, how in this, or any other Sence it proves them innate.

§. 15. The Senses at first let in particular Idea's, and furnish the yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by Degrees learns the use of general Names. By this manner the Mind comes to be furnish'd with Idea's and Language, the Materials about which to exercise its discursive Faculty: And the use of Reason becomes daily more visible, as these Materials, that give it Employment, increase. But though the having of general Idea's, and the use of general Words and Reason usually grow together; yet, I see not, how this any way proves them innate. The Knowledge of some Truths, I confess, is very early in the Mind; but in a way that shews them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about Idea's, not innate, but acquired: It being about those first, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earliest to do, and which make the most frequent Impressions on their Senses. In Idea's, thus got, the Mind discovers, That some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of Memory; as soon as it is able, to retain and receive distinct Idea's: But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does so, long before it has the use of Words; or comes to that, which we commonly call the use of Reason. For a Child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the Idea's of Sweet and Bitter (i. e. That Sweet is not Bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) That Worm-wood and Sugar-plumbs, are not the same thing.